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ABSTRACT
In many developed countries, low-risk stocks tend to earn superior risk-adjusted returns 
compared to high-risk stock. Using data on the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 2004 
and 2015, this paper shows that the abnormal returns associated with investing in low-beta 
stocks are significant and robust. The zero-cost portfolio that longs low-beta stocks and 
shorts high-beta stocks delivers monthly four-factor alpha of 1.26%. This paper provides 
suggestive evidence that, in addition to leverage constraints, the low-risk anomaly can be 
caused by institutional designs that favour stocks that are index constituents.
Keywords: beta, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), leverage constraints, benchmarking, 
index inclusion
INTRODUCTION
Asset pricing theory suggests that investors should not be able to earn abnormal 
returns in excess of the “fair” compensation they receive for the risks they take 
on. Such systematic abnormal excess returns have come to be known as returns 
“anomalies”, and are often linked to firm characteristics such as size, growth 
opportunities, past returns, investments, profitability (e.g., Fama & French (1993); 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993); Novy-Marx (2013); Titman, Wei, & Xie (2013)) or 
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market conditions (e.g., Pástor & Stambaugh (2003); Ang, Hodrick, Xing Zhang 
(2006)). The relationship between such anomalies and identifiable characteristics 
allow us to gain better understanding of risk determinants, as well as form profitable 
trading strategies.1 However, one class of anomaly that is of particular interest 
is the “low-risk” anomaly, where assets with low risk (e.g. beta or idiosyncratic 
volatility) seem to outperform assets with high risk. Consider Figure 1, where 
average Sharpe-Lintner betas of stocks listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
between January 2004 and December 2015 are plotted against their excess returns. 
In the Capital Asset Pricing Model that is often taught in finance classes, the 
relationship between systematic risk and returns is positive, but the figure reveals 
an opposite picture. In other words, high-risk assets are overpriced, and low-risk 
assets are underpriced.2
Figure 1. Relationship between stock beta and annualised excess returns. This scatter 
diagram plots the average excess returns for each stock in the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand against the calculated Sharpe-Lintner beta over the period of 
January 2004 to December 2015. Excess returns are calculated as the monthly 
return minus the one-month Thai Treasury bill rate, annualised and presented 
as percentage points. To be included in the sample, stocks must have at least 60 
months of returns, leaving 453 unique stocks in total. An ordinary least squares 
regression is fitted to the data points and the resulting best-fit line is plotted as 
the dotted line in the diagram.
The fact that stocks with low risk seem to earn better returns is appealing 
for asset managers; after all, this is opposite of the “high-risk, high-return” mantra 
that is the fundamental principle of finance. There are several candidate theories 
that seek to explain this anomaly: some rely on behavioral biases and sentiments 
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that affect retail investors (e.g. Barberis & Huang (2008), Kumar (2009), and 
Antoniou, Doukas & Subrahmanyam (2015)), some on limits to arbitrage through 
leverage constraints that are binding even for some institutional investors (e.g. 
Black (1972) and Frazzini & Pedersen (2014)), or a combination of both (e.g. 
Hong & Sraer (2016)).
The objective of this paper is to document the low-risk anomaly in Thailand 
and understand the forces that drive the abnormal returns so as to provide insights 
into if and how market participants can benefit from this anomaly. Consistent 
with evidence found in developed markets, Thai stocks with low beta also exhibit 
positive abnormal returns while high-beta stocks exhibit negative abnormal 
returns over the 12-year period of 2004 to 2015. The zero-cost portfolio that longs 
low-beta stocks and shorts high-beta stocks delivers monthly four-factor alpha of 
1.26%, a very significant amount even after taking into account trading costs. The 
evidence on the nature and timing of low-beta returns do not fully support the 
leading explanations that are proposed for developed markets. Using stock trade 
data from the Stock of Exchange of Thailand between 2004 and 2008 that classifies 
investors by type, this paper shows that investors tend to be more active in high-
beta stocks, particularly non-retail investors. High-beta stocks in Thailand tend 
to have larger market capitalisation and are more likely to be index constituents. 
As mutual funds tend to be evaluated based on index-based returns benchmark, 
this finding is consistent with Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) who argue that 
the low-beta anomaly is driven by such benchmarking. Moreover, stocks that are 
included in indices tend to be in higher demand (e.g. Jain (1987), Kaul, Mehrotra 
& Morck (2000) and Chen, Noronha, & Singal (2004)).3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The idea that high-risk assets may be overpriced is not new: Black (1972) shows 
that, with borrowing restrictions (e.g. margin requirements), low-beta stocks can 
perform better than predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), while high-beta stocks can perform worse. Empirically, several studies 
(e.g. Black, Jensen, & Scholes (1972) and Fama & French (1992)) have documented 
that the relationship between beta and returns of the CAPM is flatter than the model 
implies. The empirical shortcomings of the CAPM has led to numerous papers that 
either attempt to extend the model by including other risk factors (e.g. Fama & 
French (1993), Jegadeesh & Titman (1993); Novy-Marx (2013)) or critique the 
assumptions behind the model (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny (1997); Gromb & Vayanos 
(2002); Acharya & Pedersen (2005)), but the main focus of academic studies had 
not been on the anomaly itself.
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The low-risk anomaly received greater attention when Ang et al. (2006) 
and Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2009) find that high-risk stocks (in their 
papers, risk is defined as idiosyncratic volatility rather than beta) tend to earn 
very low average returns. The low-risk anomaly has been discussed under both 
systematic (beta) and idiosyncratic risk measures, but portfolios that have low 
systematic risk also tends to have low idiosyncratic risk. However, as systematic 
risk exposure tends to be similar across similar businesses, one may argue that 
the low-risk returns are attributable to stocks that are in relatively more stable 
industries. Baker, Bradley and Taliaferro (2014) find that the superior performance 
comes from both picking low-beta stocks (micro effect) in low-beta industry/
country (macro effect). This finding is further corroborated by Asness, Frazzini 
and Pedersen (2014) who document that low-risk investing strategy delivers 
positive returns even as industry-neutral bets. In addition, the positive returns have 
also been found in many developed countries and across several asset classes (e.g. 
Baker et al. (2014) and Frazzini & Pedersen (2014)). 
While there are several potential explanations for this anomaly, the most 
often-cited theory stems from leverage constraints. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
provides a simple framework that helps us understand how limited arbitrage 
capital that is constrained by borrowing capacity can allow prices to diverge far 
from their fundamental values. The intuition has been developed further in Gromb 
and Vayanos (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Rytchkov (2014). Frazzini and Pedersen 
(2014) extend the model of Black (1972) and derive a zero-cost, market-neutral 
pricing factor called BAB (betting against beta) – that is, a portfolio that longs low-
beta stocks and shorts high-beta stocks.4 In their model, agents that cannot borrow 
must overweight high-beta stocks in order to achieve higher returns, making the 
security market line flatter (similar to Black (1972)), but the slope depends on the 
tightness of the funding constraints. Other forms of institutional frictions can also 
impose limits to arbitrage. For example, Baker et al. (2011) argue that distortions 
created by returns benchmarking can induce the anomaly.
Other leading explanations posit that investors/agents are prone to 
behavioral biases or market sentiments. For example, Kumar (2009) finds that 
some individuals exhibit preference for stocks with lottery-like payoffs, while Bali, 
Cakici and Whitelaw (2011) also find that portfolios with lottery-like payoffs tend 
to exhibit poor returns. Antoniou et al. (2015) find evidence that sentiment affects 
the security market line; noise traders appear to be more bullish about high-beta 
stocks when market sentiments are good. Combining both market sentiments and 
limits to arbitrage, Hong and Sraer (2016) propose a model where the direction of 
the risk-return relationship depends on disagreement about the market’s prospect; 
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when disagreement is high, high-beta assets tend to be more prone to speculative 
overpricing when there are short-sale constraints. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The data used in the analysis comes from several sources. Equity market data is 
retrieved from Thompson Reuters Datastream and contains total return, market 
capitalisation and the book-to-market ratio of all common stocks in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) at monthly frequency between January 2001 and 
December 2015, and the monthly return of the SET50 index which is used as the 
proxy for market returns. The index is a market capitalisation-weighted price index 
of 50 listed companies on SET, selected based on large market capitalisation, high 
liquidity and availability of free-float stocks for general. Stocks that are classified 
as under rehabilitation plan as well as stocks that do not trade consecutively for 
three months are excluded from the sample. Because historical returns are used 
to estimate the stock beta (methodology to be described subsequently), the final 
sample runs from January 2004 to December 2015 and contains 453 stocks in total. 
Risk-free rate used for calculations of excess returns and market risk premium 
is the one-month Thai government Treasury bill retrieved from Bloomberg. The 
market capitalisation and book-to-market ratio are used for construction of Fama 
and French (1993) size small-minus-big (SMB) and value high-minus-low (HML) 
factor-mimicking portfolios respectively. Past returns are used to construct the 
Carhart (1997) momentum up-minus-down (UMD) factor.5 
METHODOLOGY
To rank the stocks based on their ex-ante beta, the beta is estimated based on 
historical volatility and stock return’s correlation with market return. Following 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) procedure for monthly data, each stock’s beta is 
calculated using the following formula:
( / )its i i mb t v v=t t t t
where ivt  and mvt  are estimated volatilities for stock  and the market using one-
year (12 months) rolling window. itt  is the estimated correlation between stock i 
and the market, calculated over a three-year (36 months) horizon. With the ex-ante 
betas, stocks can be ranked in each month into 5 groups based on their previous 
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months’ beta, construct equally-weighted portfolios, and examine the properties 
of returns using various specifications of the linear factor pricing model of the 
following general form:
, ...,r f j 1 5, ' , ,j te j j t j ta b f= + + =
where r ,j te  is the equally-weighted excess returns of stocks in portfolio ,j ft  is 
the vector of factors of the pricing model, jb  is the vector of the factor loadings 
on portfolio ,j , and ja  the systematic abnormal excess returns associated with 
strategy of portfolio j  (our outcome of interest). All returns are computed as 
monthly percentage point. Stocks are sorted based on their ex-ante estimated 
beta in ascending order, so portfolio 1 corresponds to stocks with lowest beta and 
portfolio 5 highest beta. The linear factor pricing model specifications to be used 
are Sharpe-Lintner CAPM single-factor model, Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. All standard errors in the linear 
pricing regressions are adjusted for heteroskedascity and autocorrelation using 
Newey-West standard error with lag of 12 months.
RESULTS
First, this study examines whether raw returns of beta-sorted portfolio exhibit the 
low-risk anomaly. Table 1 presents the excess returns of stocks in each portfolio 
along with the corresponding average beta, market capitalisation and book-to-
market ratio. The raw returns are indeed decreasing in the stock beta, as evident in 
the scatter diagram earlier (Figure 1). Figure 2 plots the excess returns by portfolio 
for convenient visual inspection. On average, low-beta stocks tend to be smaller, 
while the average book-to-market ratio is similar across portfolios. Of course, the 
returns differences can be attributed to different risk characteristics, so in the next 
step the differences are further investigated under several specifications of the 
linear factor-pricing model.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of beta-sorted portfolios
This table provides descriptive statistics of the beta-sorted portfolio over the period of 
January 2004 to December 2015 (144 months). At the beginning of each calendar month, 
stocks in the Stock Exchange of Thailand are ranked based in ascending order based on 
their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. All stocks are given equal weights 
within each portfolio, and portfolio are rebalanced every month. Portfolio 1 contains 
stocks with the lowest beta, and portfolio 5 the highest. Beta is estimated using covariance 
and standard deviation calculated over rolling windows of 36 months and 12 months 
respectively. Market capitalisation is measured in millions of baht, and book-to-market 
ratio is obtained at the monthly frequency.
Portfolio Excess returns 
(monthly, %)
Estimated beta Market capitalisation 
(THB million)
Book-to-market 
ratio
1 0.59 0.38 6,254.77 1.03
2 0.50 0.60 11,957.56 1.09
3 0.50 0.78 17,098.99 1.04
4 0.37 0.99 27,347.93 1.03
5 –0.49 1.42 25,112.22 0.95
Figure 2. Monthly excess returns of beta-sorted portfolios. This scatter diagram plots 
the average monthly excess returns for beta-sorted portfolio over the period of 
January 2004 to December 2015. Excess returns are calculated as the monthly 
return minus the one-month Thai Treasury bill rate, presented as percentage 
points. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks in the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand are ranked based in ascending order based on their estimated beta 
at the end of the previous month. All stocks are given equal weights within each 
portfolio, and portfolio are rebalanced every month. Portfolio 1 contains stocks 
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with the lowest beta, and portfolio 5 the highest.
Table 2
Returns of beta-sorted portfolios
The following table reports the returns of the beta-sorted portfolio over the period of January 2004 to 
December 2015. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
are ranked based in ascending order based on their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. 
All stocks are given equal weights within each portfolio, and portfolio are rebalanced every month. 
Portfolio 1 contains stocks with the lowest beta, and portfolio 5 the highest. The sixth column is a 
self-financing, long-short portfolio that longs portfolio 1 and shorts portfolio 5. In the top half of 
the table, monthly excess returns of the portfolios are reported along with annualised volatility and 
Sharpe ratio. The benchmark risk-free rate used is the one-month Thai Treasury bill. The bottom half 
of the panel reports the alphas corresponding to different specifications of the linear factor pricing 
model. The CAPM alpha is the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model which uses the return on the 
SET50 index as proxy for market returns. The three-factor model adds the Fama and French (1993) 
SMB and HML factor-mimicking portfolios, while the four-factor model adds the Carhart (1997) 
UMD factor. Excess returns and alphas are in monthly percent, and t-statistics are reported in square 
parentheses. All standard errors in the linear pricing regressions are adjusted for heteroskedascity 
and autocorrelation using Newey-West standard error with lag of 12 months. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)–(5)
Excess returns 0.593** 0.497 0.503 0.373 –0.495 1.088**
[2.135] [1.555] [1.097] [0.645] [–0.681] [2.003]
Volatility 
(annualised)
11.55 13.30 19.06 24.02 30.22 22.57
Sharpe ratio 
(annualised)
0.62 0.45 0.32 0.19 –0.20 0.58
Alphas
Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM
0.546** 0.436* 0.406 0.247 –0.656* 1.203***
[2.076] [1.717] [1.278] [0.811] [–1.928] [3.597]
Three-Factor 0.455** 0.245** 0.178 –0.00197 –0.924*** 1.378***
(Fama & French, 
1993)
[2.304] [2.126] [1.275] [–0.0128] [–4.545] [4.223]
Four-Factor 0.492** 0.308** 0.263* 0.148 –0.767*** 1.259***
(Carhart, 1997) [2.327] [2.519] [1.858] [0.979] [–4.645] [4.179]
Before proceeding further with the analysis, the returns characteristics of the beta-
sorted portfolios as presented in Table 2. Portfolio 1, which has the lowest beta, 
also has the lowest volatility (here, annualised), while portfolio 5 which has the 
highest beta has the highest volatility. The relationship between risk and return is 
decreasing under both measures of risk, consistent with Baker et al. (2011) and 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). In addition, the Sharpe ratio is also decreasing in 
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beta. A zero-cost investment strategy which longs low-beta stocks (portfolio 1) 
and shorts high-beta stocks (portfolio 5) returns 1.09% per month with annualised 
Sharpe ratio of 0.58.
Table 2 also presents the alphas of the portfolios under different 
specifications of the linear factor pricing model. The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
alpha suggests that the abnormal returns associated at either extremes of the beta 
spectrum are statistically significant. Stocks with lowest beta earn 0.55% more 
per month than predicted by the model, while stocks with highest beta earn 0.66% 
less.6 The zero-cost, long-short portfolio earns an astonishing 1.2% abnormal 
returns per month, far in excess of any trading costs that could be involved in 
executing the strategy.
One concern that may arise from results in Table 1 is that average market 
capitalisation of stocks in the portfolios is different, which could consequently 
affect returns. The three-factor model incorporates these characteristics. With the 
inclusion of the size premium, the alphas the portfolios decrease slightly but the 
alphas remain statistically significant. Finally, the inclusion of the momentum 
factor still leaves the results intact. The long-short portfolio delivers monthly four-
factor alpha of 1.26%, statistically significant at 1% level. Overall, the superior 
returns of the low-risk strategy are statistically significant and robust to several 
specifications of the linear factor-pricing model. 
UNDERSTANDING THE LOW-RISK ANOMALY
What could be the economic forces behind the low-risk anomaly in Thailand? In 
this section, the issue is further explored. Two leading explanations for the anomaly 
are behavioural biases and leverage constraints, as discussed in Literature Review.
Many classes of investors in Thailand face leverage constraints where 
securities borrowing and selling is expensive for retail investors, and many 
institutional investors face explicit borrowing constraints.7 Consequently, they may 
be forced to invest in riskier assets in order to generate returns for their investors.8 
To investigate the leverage constraints, the BAB factor proposed by 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) is employed. The steps in the construction the BAB 
factor involve partitioning the universe of stocks into two groups: low-beta and 
high-beta. The stocks in each group are then weighted based on beta-sorted ranks 
which are scaled by average portfolio beta so that average beta in each group is 
exactly one. The factor-mimicking portfolio longs low-beta stocks and shorts high-
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beta stocks. When the two groups are netted off against each other, the resulting 
portfolio is both zero-cost and zero-beta (i.e. market-neutral). The BAB factor is 
negatively correlated with stock market returns, as shown in Figure 3. No proxy 
for funding liquidity (like the TED spread in the U.S.) is available in Thailand, 
but suppose one argues that funding liquidity tightens during periods when stock 
market performs poorly, then the correlation between the BAB factor and funding 
liquidity has the opposite sign to what is expected and demonstrated in Frazzini 
and Pedersen (2014), where BAB factor performs worse when funding liquidity 
tightens.
Figure 3. BAB factor versus equity market risk premium. This graph plots the monthly 
values of the BAB factor and equity market risk premium measured as percentage 
points. BAB factor is displayed as bars and equity market risk premium as line. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two factors is –0.7256 and 
statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 3 shows the results of the linear factor-pricing model with the addition of the 
BAB factor. As expected, the loading on the BAB factor declines as portfolio beta 
increases. However, the alphas associated with the portfolios, while lower than the 
baseline model, are still non-zero and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
BAB factor cannot fully explain the anomaly. Taken together with Figure 3, the 
results in Table 3 suggest that leverage constraints can at best partially explain the 
low-risk anomaly in Thailand.
The next leading explanation is investor behavioural biases. There are several 
mechanisms through which behavioral biases can affect stock prices, but one 
mechanism that could be tested here is investor sentiment. Antoniou et al. (2015) 
find that during periods where market sentiments are pessimistic, average returns 
on high-beta portfolios are higher than low-beta portfolios, while the low-risk 
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anomaly is found during optimistic periods, where unsophisticated investors are 
more bullish about prices of high-beta stocks and bid up their prices. However, 
Figure 3 reveals an opposite pattern: when stock market returns perform well 
(arguably optimistic market sentiments), the low-risk portfolio performs worse. 
Investor sentiment does not seem to the driving force in Thailand either.
Table 3
Explaining abnormal returns using BAB factor 
The following table reports the factor loadings of the linear pricing model for the beta-sorted portfolio 
over the period of January 2004 to December 2015. At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks 
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand are ranked based in ascending order based on their estimated 
beta at the end of the previous month. All stocks are given equal weights within each portfolio, and 
portfolio are rebalanced every month. Portfolio 1 contains stocks with the lowest beta, and portfolio 
5 the highest. The sixth column is a self-financing, long-short portfolio that longs portfolio 1 and 
shorts portfolio 5. The linear factor pricing model augments the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
with BAB factor as proposed by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). BAB factor is constructed as self-
financing, zero-beta portfolio that longs low-beta stocks and shorts high-beta stocks. The factor-
mimicking portfolio is rebalanced every month. Alphas are in monthly percent, and t-statistics are 
reported in square parentheses. All standard errors in the linear pricing regressions are adjusted for 
heteroskedascity and autocorrelation using Newey-West standard error with lag of 12 months. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1)–(5)
RMRF 0.774*** 0.617*** 0.887*** 1.066*** 1.321*** –0.547***
[21.27] [14.26] [26.90] [18.76] [12.57] [–5.585]
SMB 0.707*** 0.616*** 0.847*** 1.018*** 1.191*** –0.485***
[8.807] [6.551] [9.143] [14.51] [11.97] [–5.120]
HML 0.567*** 0.592*** 0.664*** 0.684*** 0.695*** –0.128
[14.41] [9.185] [8.070] [8.470] [5.843] [–1.208]
UMD –0.139*** –0.0857*** –0.0923*** –0.149*** –0.133** –0.00593
[–5.285] [–3.272] [–2.655] [–4.140] [–2.442] [–0.125]
BAB 0.524*** 0.0391 –0.0812* –0.214*** –0.347*** 0.872***
[10.12] [1.128] [–1.739] [–3.729] [–2.771] [8.164]
Alpha 0.395*** 0.301** 0.278* 0.187 –0.703*** 1.098***
 [3.104] [2.469] [1.911] [1.217] [–4.468] [5.576]
Notes. RMRF = market factor (market return minus risk-free rate); SMB = size factor (small [market cap] minus 
big); HML = value factor (high [book-to-market ratio] minus low); UMD = momentum factor (up [trend] minus 
down); BAB = betting against beta factor
The results here are rather perplexing: the low-risk anomaly is present and 
robust in Thailand, yet leading explanations do not seem to explain the anomaly 
very well in this setting. So in the next step, the analysis turns to identity of the 
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groups of investors that participate in each risk stratum in the market. Using stock 
trade data in SET that allows classification of traders by investor group (here, retail 
investors, mutual funds, and other groups which comprise proprietary trading and 
foreign investors) available from 2004 to 2008, this paper examines the average 
monthly trade value of stocks in each portfolio. The results are displayed in Table 
4. Investors in all groups tend to invest in high-beta stocks more. However, non-
retail investors tend to invest in high-beta stocks disproportionately more than 
retail investors. To the extent that behavioural bias explanations are typically 
associated with activities of retail investors, the anomaly here seems to be more 
related to non-retail investors.
Table 4
Trades by investor group of beta-sorted portfolios
This table provides characteristics of the beta-sorted portfolio over the period of January 2004 to 
December 2008 (60 months). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks in the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand are ranked based in ascending order based on their estimated beta at the end of the 
previous month. All stocks are given equal weights within each portfolio, and portfolio are rebalanced 
every month. Portfolio 1 contains stocks with the lowest beta, and portfolio 5 the highest. Beta is 
estimated using covariance and standard deviation calculated over rolling windows of 36 months and 
12 months respectively. Market capitalization and trade value (both buy and sell transactions) are 
measured in millions of baht. Stocks that are SET100 index constituents are identified. Other groups 
of investors include proprietary trading by securities companies and foreign investors.
Portfolio
Monthly trade value (THB million)
Estimated
Beta
Market 
Capitalisation
(THB million)
Index
Constituents 
(%)Retail Mutual Others
1 111.60 2.64 12.45 –0.09 2,564.88 1.7
2 50.61 6.79 21.84 0.19 4,077.62 5.4
3 143.67 21.80 80.05 0.42 7,590.62 14.8
4 399.94 87.55 352.89 0.73 21,262.81 26.7
5 1,048.81 137.47 570.60 1.36 27,360.12 35.3
In fact, these high-beta stocks tend to have larger market capitalisation, which 
make them more likely to be member of stock indices (Table 4). If the investment 
performance of non-retail investors are evaluated relative to index-based 
benchmarks, then the fact that such investors tend to be disproportionately more 
active in large-cap stocks (which happen to have high beta) could be a friction 
induced by institutional design. In that case, this finding is consistent with Baker 
et al. (2011), who argue that investment managers happily invest in overpriced, 
high-beta stocks because it minimises their tracking error, a dimension which 
they are evaluated on. In addition, some classes of institutional investors – both 
domestic and foreign – may have explicit investment restrictions that permit to 
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them to invest in only a subset of stocks, typically large-cap stocks which belong 
to some index. For this reason, such stocks tend to have higher demand relative to 
other stocks (e.g. Jain (1987), Kaul et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2004)), so index 
inclusion could be another force that drives the low-beta anomaly.9 Given the fact 
that Thai households are increasingly investing their wealth through mutual funds 
(up from 7.5% of GDP in 2000 to 30% in 2015), index-based benchmarking of 
fund returns could be good news for investors of non-index, low-beta stocks.10
CONCLUSION
This paper documents the existence of the low-beta anomaly in the Thai stock 
market. The abnormal returns are significant – both economically and statistically 
– and robust to several specifications of the linear factor pricing model. Further 
analyses suggest that leverage constraints may play a part in the existence of this 
anomaly, but frictions from benchmarking and index inclusion are more plausible 
explanations in this case. However, the results of the analyses on the cause of 
the anomaly should only be interpreted as suggestive evidence: to draw a definite 
conclusion, better data on funding liquidity and investor portfolio holdings are 
required.
For most other market anomalies, evidence suggests that profits associated 
with publicly available strategies tend to diminish as “arbitrage capital” grows 
(e.g. Chordia, Subrahmanyam & Tong (2014) and Hanson & Sunderam (2014)). 
However, in this case, given that most institutional investors that participate in the 
Thai stock market are not in the position to exploit this strategy, this provides an 
opportunity for the unrestricted investors. The low-beta strategy offers superior 
risk-adjusted returns and the best of both worlds–higher returns and lower volatility. 
NOTES
1. Often, this is referred to as “style investing”, where portfolio formation strategies 
are designed based on stock characteristics that earn anomalous returns not 
predicted by baseline pricing model.
2. The positive relationship between beta and return has been questioned long in the 
past (e.g. Black et al. (1972) and Fama & French (1992)) and received renewed 
attention recently (e.g. Ang et al. (2006), Ang et al. (2009), Baker et al. (2011), 
Baker et al. (2014) and Frazzini & Pedersen (2014)).
3. To illustrate why stocks with abnormally high demand can be bad for investors, 
consider a high-beta stock. High demand for such stock causes investors to bid 
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up its price. Note that investor demand – high or low – does not affect expected 
future cash flow that such stock would generate. With future payoffs the same, all 
else equal, higher purchase price translates into lower return than the asset-pricing 
model predicts in equilibrium. Conversely, if a low-beta stock has abnormally low 
demand, its price will be lower than it should be; all else equal, its return will be 
higher than predicted.
4. The BAB portfolio is not like a typical long-short portfolio in a sense that 
the weights of each stock and risk-free asset in the long and short groups are 
determined such that both groups have beta of one. When they are netted off 
against each other, the portfolio is market-neutral, i.e. has beta of zero.
5. All stocks in SET are used in the construction of the factors. SMB and HML factors 
are created from 2 x 3 sort and rebalanced annually using the market capitalisation 
and book-to-market ratio at the end of December in each year. UMD is calculated 
based on past cumulative returns from 2 to 12 months and sorted into 3 equal-size 
portfolios which are rebalanced monthly.
6. The beta loadings of the portfolios are unreported, but are similar in magnitude to 
the average ex-ante beta of the portfolios.
7. In particular, Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 Section 126 prohibits mutual 
funds in Thailand from borrowing.
8. Explicit investment restrictions have been shown to artificially affect demand for 
risky assets and compel institutional investors to “reach for yield”, as shown by 
Becker and Ivashina (2015).
9. Large-cap stocks in Thailand tend to receive more media coverage, and 
consequently investors may be disproportionately more inclined to invest in such 
stocks, bidding up their prices. However, the inclusion of the SMB factor in the 
linear factor pricing model partially mitigates the size-coverage effect. The author 
thanks the referee for suggesting the discussion of this issue.
10. As investment in mutual funds gains popularity, the proportion of retail investors 
trading value in the Thai stock market has declined steadily from 76% in 2003 to 
50% in 2016.
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